During the MR3 agreements, PTV franchisees submitted reports on maintenance and renewal work, which they reviewed in monthly meetings. However, until recently, these reports and meetings focused on operational issues and progress in maintenance and renewal. Determine whether the franchise agreements for the tram and tram system in 2004 represented a cheap value for money. Under current agreements, tram performance was consistent and above service thresholds – 98% for reliability and 77% for punctuality – as shown in Figure 1F. If PTV successfully negotiates new seven-year contracts with existing franchisees, this will end the current 15-year agreements. There is no other performance-oriented right to extend it. The PTV must then open the tendering process for other potential operators. Until 2014, the State guaranteed ticketing revenues due to uncertainties when the myki ticketing system was introduced. Since 2014, franchisees have been exposed to the risk of variable ticketing revenues. This risk is reduced by the regular redefinition of franchisees` forecasts of ticketing revenues to align with actual revenues and by a risk-sharing regime that sets a ceiling and limit below the level of risk the franchisee would bear. Charts 1I and 1J include actual ticketing receipts and risk reduction payments after January 2014. However, PTV does not include actual box office receipts in its public report in Track Record.
The MR4 franchise negotiations are not a standard procurement process, as they involve exclusive negotiations, so they do not fit into the guidelines and guidelines of the Victorian Government Procurement Board or Partnerships Victoria. It is also not subject to the high-risk, high-value procedure of the Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF). The Operational Performance Scheme (OPR) bonus and penalties are set on the basis of passenger-weighted minutes (PWM) delay. PWM measures the effects of an individual service delay or cancellation, is weighted for peak periods and takes into account events that are not controlled by franchisees, such as. B public transgression or disease. Although PTV provided VicTrack with the information necessary to meet their accounting and financial reporting obligations, PTV and VicTrack did not cooperate to share more detailed asset information and VicTrack did not participate in asset management meetings between PTV and franchisees. Figure 3A summarizes the key maintenance and renewal reports provided by PTV franchisees, as well as all the issues we have identified with each report. The rail tram and tram contract management plan was established in November 2009. It defines the overall approach, including contractual objectives, roles and responsibilities, reporting and communication protocols, and governance requirements. The plan is supported by 36 contract management guides that define how PTV will monitor, manage and implement the obligations of the agreements.
Since 2009, the government has provided more than $7.6 billion to franchisees to operate Victoria`s train and streetcar networks – MTM $5.4 billion and $2.2 billion to Yarra Trams through June 30, 2016. These payments cover a number of services and activities grouped in Figure 1H and do not include the rental amounts of rail vehicles made by franchisees on behalf of the State. We have seen significant weaknesses in the way PTV monitors the maintenance and renewal of assets leased to its franchisees under current agreements. In particular, PTV does not have adequate medium- and long-term asset strategies for its train and tram network facilities. The project agreement provides for a consultation process for the state and franchisees to plan, develop and implement joint projects. Current agreements do not allow for regular review and rejection of benchmarks.